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SUMMARIES 
This paper traces the influence of the Boolean 
school, and more specifically of Peirce and his stu- 
dents, on the development of modern logic. In the 
1890s it was Schz%der's Algebra der Loqik that repre- 
sented the state of the art. This work mentions Frege, 
but the quantifier notation it adopts (a variant of the 
modern notation) is credited to Peirce and his students 
0. H. Mitchell and Christine Ladd-Franklin. This nota- 
tion was widely adopted; both Zennelo and Ltlwenheim 
wrote famous papers in Peirce-Schrader notation. Even 
Whitehead (in 1908, in his Universal Algebra) fails to 
mention Frege, but cites the "suggestive papers" by 
Mitchell and Ladd-Franklin. (Russell credits Frege, 
with many things, but nowhere credits him with the 
quantifer; if the quantifiers in Principia were devised 
by Whitehead, they probably come from Peirce). The 
aim of this paper is not to detract from our apprecia- 
tion of Frege's great work, but to emphasize that its 
influence came largely after 1900 (after Russell pointed 
out its significance). Although Frege discovered the 
quantifier in 1879 and Peirce's student Mitchell inde- 
pendently discovered it only in 1883, it was Mitchell's 
discovery (as modified and disseminated'by Peirce) that 
made the quantifier part of logic. And neither 
Lbwenheim's theorem nor Zermelo set-theory depended on 
Frege's work at all, but only on the work of the Boole- 
Peirce school. 
Nous retraqons, dans cet article, l'influence sur 
le dkveloppement de la logique moderne de 1'6cole 
boolienne, et plus spdcifiquement de Peirce et de ses 
Btudiants. Au tours de la derniere decennie du XIXe 
siecle, le livre de Schroder Algebra der Logik 
constituait un sumtnum dans son genre. On y mentionnait 
Frege, mais la notation des quantificateurs adoptee 
(une variante de la notation moderne) est attribude a 
Peirce et 3 ses Btudiants 0. H. Mitchell et Christine 
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Ladd-Franklin. L'emploi de cette notation fut 
largement repandue. Zermolo et Lijwenheim l'utiliskrent 
dans des articles celebres. Meme Whitehead (en 1908, 
dans son Universal Algebra) ne mentionne pas Frege; 
cependant, il se r&f&e B 1'"article Bvocateur" de 
Mitchell et Ladd-Franklin. (Russell attribue beaucoup 
de chases a Frege, toutefois a aucun moment il ne le 
fait pour les quantificateurs. Si les quantificateurs 
des Principia furent mis au point par Whitehead, ils 
originent probablement de Peirce.) Le but de cet 
article n'est pas de rabaisser l'evaluation de l'oeuvre 
si fondamentale de Frege mais plut& de faire ressortir 
que son influence est en grande partie posterieure a 
1900 (apres que Russell en fit remarquer l'importance). 
Bien que Frege ait decouvert le quantificateur en 1879 
et que Mitchell, l'btudiant de Peirce, ne l'ait 
decouvert independamment qu'en 1883, ce fut par la 
decouverte de Mitchell (telle que modifiee et rkpandue 
par Peirce) que le quantificateur prit place en logique. 
Ni le theoreme de Liiwenheim, ni la theorie des 
ensembles de Zermolo ne reposerent sur l'oeuvre de 
Frege. Ils s'edifierent uniquement sur l'oeuvre de 
Boole et Peirce. 
In diesem Beitrag wird der Einflu$ der Boole'schen 
Schule, insbesondere derjenige von Peirce und seinen 
Schtil ern, auf die Entwicklung der modernen Logik 
untersucht. In den 90er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts 
stellte Schrijders "Algebra der Logik" den damals 
erreichten Stand dar. Darin wird Frege erwahnt, aber 
das verwendete Zeichen fiir den Quantor (eine Variante 
der modernen Symbolik) wird Peirce und seinen Schiilern 
0. H. Mitchell und Christine Ladd-Franklin zugeschrieben. 
Diese Symbolik wurde weithin iibernommen; sowohl 
Zermelo wie Lowenheim schrieben beriihmte Abhandlungen 
in der Bezeichnungsweise von Peirce-Schr6der. Selbst 
Whitehead erw;ihnt in der "Universal Algebra" (1908) 
Frege nicht, zitiert aber die "vorbildlichen Abhand- 
lungen" von Mitchell und Ladd-Franklin. (Russell 
schreibt Frege vieles zu, doch nirgends den Quantor; 
falls die Quantoren in den "Principia" von Whitehead 
entwickelt wurden, gehen sie wahrscheinlich auf Frege 
zuriick.) Es ist nicht Absicht dieses Aufsatzes, 
unsere Wertschatzung von Freges bedeutendem Werk zu 
verkleinern, sondern zu betonen, da8 sein Einflu$ im 
wesentlichen nach 1900 zu verzeichnen ist (nachdem 
Russell seine Bedeutung hervorgehoben hatte). Obgleich 
Frege den Quantor 1879 und Peirces Schiiler Mitchell ihn 
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unabhangig 1883 entdeckt hatten, wurde durch Mitchells 
Entdeckung (in der von Peirce modifizierten und ver- 
breiteten Form) der Quantor Bestandteil der Logik. 
Weder Lowenheims Theorem noch die Mengenlehre Zermelos 
waren von Freges Untersuchungen abhangig, vielmehr 
stiitzten sich beide auf Arbeiten der Bocle-Peirce-Schule. 
My topic is hardly one on which I can be said to have spec- 
ialized knowledge or training. I am not a historian of logic, 
nor (although I regard Peirce as a towering giant among Ameri- 
can philosophers) am I a "Peirce scholar." Indeed, it is highly 
unlikely that I shall tell you anything that Professor Eisele 
could not tell you better. But I am a working logician who 
found himself at one time lea, if only for a few months and if 
only out of a quite personal curiosity, to research the early 
history of mathematical logic, and thereby to discover just what 
Peirce's contribution to and stature in 19th-century logic was; 
and it may be fitting if I use this occasion to "debrief" myself, 
as the intelligence agencies say. 
I shall not concern myself with the actual details of Peirce's 
system, although there are matters there that are of interest to 
students of Peirce's philosophy. (For example, Hans Herzberger 
has verified a claim that Peirce often makes, that in the Peircian 
"logic of relatives" all four- and higher-term relations are 
reducible to triadic relations, but that it is not possible in 
general to reduce a higher-degree relation to diadic relations. 
This claim has metaphysical significance within Peirce's system 
because of its connection with "thirdness" [Herzberger 19811.) 
Nor shall I concern myself with what is or has become esoteric 
in Peirce's logical work, as the method of existential graphs 
has become. Rather, my aim is to tell you how much that is 
quite familiar in modern logic actually became known to the 
logical world through the efforts of Peirce and his students. 
MY "BOOLEAN" MOTIVATION 
What triggered my investigations was a certain admiration I 
have for George Boole, and a certain piece of disrespect to 
Boole and his followers on the part of Quine. I would not have 
fully appreciated Boole's mathematical mind if it had not been 
for a couple of accidents, which I must tell you about. In my 
twenties I knew, of course, that Boole was the inventor of 
"Boolean algebra" (which I knew from contemporary texts, not 
from 19th-century ones). I had learned that he had taken holy 
orders, and not knowing then what I know now about early-19th- 
century England, I pictured Boole much more as a clergyman than 
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as a mathematician. I supposed he might have been an amateur 
whose discovery of mathematical logic was rather the product of 
one good idea and some modest mathematical ingenuity than of 
real power. 
Just as I turned thirty, however, I was working on Hilbert's 
10th Problem with Martin Davis. In the course of a summer's re- 
search he and I (with some crucial help from Julia Robinson) 
succeeded in showing the unsolvability of the decision problem 
for exponential Diophantine equations (a result which Matyasevich 
improved a few years later to complete the "negative solution" 
of Hilbert's 10th Problem--that is, the proof that the decision 
problem for ordinary Diophantine equations is unsolvable.) The 
fact is that the first proof of our result that Davis and I 
found used a bit of complicated mathematical analysis. This 
was later eliminated when Julia Robinson simplified the entire 
proof drastically and eliminated one unproved number-theoretic 
hypothesis that Davis and I had had to use. We had to use, in 
fact, the theory of the gamma function, which we learned from 
Whittaker and Watson and an old mathematics text--Boole's 
Calculus of Finite Differences [1860], a theory of the evalua- 
tion of indefinite sums and products that Boole developed on 
the basis of an ingenious generalization of the ideas of the 
differential and integral calculus. At this point I became 
aware that Boole was not a clerical amateur but a very high 
powered mathematician. 
During the summer Davis taught me a little bit of modern 
"operator methods" in differential equations. These methods, 
which are based on the idea of a "ring of operators," go back 
directly to another idea of Boole's [1859]--the idea of treating 
the symbol for differentiation as if it were the name of a 
strange kind of number. Indeed, Boole solved differential equa- 
tions by exactly the method that was just then (in the late 
fifties) beginning to work its way down into the more sophisti- 
cated introductory texts. 
This made me interested in Boole in earnest, and a little 
reading soon convinced me that Boole had a remarkable mathema- 
tical program (which he shared with a certain school of British 
analysts) and that his discovery of mathematical logic was the 
direct result of that program. The program--the program of the 
"Symbolic School" of British analysts--is today out of date, 
but in a certain sense it was the bridge between traditional 
analysis (real and complex analysis) and modern abstract alge- 
bra. In effect, Boole and his co-workers were struggling for 
the notion of an abstract ring, in the modern mathematical 
sense, i.e., a structure with an addition and a multiplication. 
They could not quite come up with this idea, but they did see 
that they wanted to free the methods of algebra from an exclu- 
sive concern with their traditional content, the real and com- 
plex numbers. So they started to use algebraic methods beyond 
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their ability to give those methods an interpretation. I do not 
mean to use these terms confusedly or vaguely, but rather formal- 
istically: in fact, Boole was quite conscious of the idea of 
disinterpretation, of the idea of using a mathematical system 
as an algorithm, transforming the signs purely mechanically with- 
out any reliance on meanings. In connection with logic, this 
very important idea appears on the opening pages of Boole's 
Laws of thought [1854]. 
Boole's work, then, was an extension of algebra beyond its 
previous bounds; the algebra of classes, the calculus of finite 
differences, and the contributions to the theory of differential 
equations were simply three parts of what Boole (and the Symbolic 
School generally) saw as a unified enterprise. Modern mathema- 
tical logic is something the early history of which cannot be 
separated from the development of modern mathematics in the di- 
rection of abstractness. 
Even before I came to appreciate Boole's "power" as a mathe- 
matician, I had known that prior to Boole logic had been in a 
straightjacket of sorts because of the fossilization of Aristo- 
telean logic during the late middle ages. Almost all logic 
texts prior to Boole (and many after Boole) taught nothing but 
syllogistic logic, or syllogistic logic with insignificant ex- 
tensions and improvements. All premises, in the inferences 
discussed, had exactly two "terms," or class names, in them: 
this was because only premises in the old 'categorical forms" 
(A, or "All S are P," I, or "Some S are P," E, or "no S are P," 
and 0, or "Some S are not P") were considered. After Boole in- 
troduced mathematical notation (as Leibniz had done earlier, 
but without issue) inferences could be studied which contained 
any number of terms and the premises and conclusions of which 
contained as many "ors," "ands," and "riots" (or class unions, 
class intersections, and complementations--Boole gave both inter- 
pretations) as you please. 
It is true that the system was still very weak, compared to 
modern quantification theory. Dyadic and higher-degree rela- 
tions could not be symbolized, and there were no quantifiers. 
But the search for an improvement in the first respect, a logic 
or "algebra" of relations, began at once, and the quantifiers 
were invented thirty-two years after the appearance of Boole's 
The Mathematical Analysis of Logic [18471 (in Frege [1879]; also 
by Peirce's student 0. H. Mitchell [1883]). I assumed that 
everyone realized that with the appearance of a complete 'alge- 
bra of classes" the dam was broken, and (given the mathematical 
sophistication of the age) the subsequent development was inev- 
itable. It seemed inconceivable to me that anyone could date 
the continuous effective development of modern mathematical 
logic from any point other than the appearacne of Boole's two 
major logical works, the Mathematical Analysis and the Laws of 
Thought. 
HM9 Peirce the Logician 295 
Yet, in a very widely used text by a philosopher I admire 
enormously, I read that "logic is an old subject and since 1879 
it has been a great one" [Quine 19501. In short, logic only 
broke out of its long stagnation with Frege. In one pen stroke 
Quine dismisses the entire Boolean school--of which Peirce was, 
in a sense, the last and greatest figure. In van Heijenoort's 
Source Book [1967] I detect a similar bias (though not as ex- 
tremely stated): the Booleans are mentioned only for the purpose 
of unflattering comparison with Frege and later authors. It is 
this biased account, the "logic was invented by Frege" account, 
that I want to rebut today. In the process, I can do honor to 
Peirce as well as to Boole--and honoring one's intellectual 
heroes is one of the purest and most self-sufficient of life's 
pleasures. 
THE BIRTH OF THE QUANTIFIER 
I do not know exactly what Quine meant by his remark; I 
suspect it was meant simply as an appreciation of the great 
richness and power of the two systems constructed by Frege 
(Begriffschrift was very similar--except for the unattractive 
notation Frege used--to today's standard systems of second-order 
logic; the Grundgesetze system, which Russell proved inconsis- 
tent, sketched the whole program of developing modern mathematics 
within higher predicate calculus, the program Russell repaired 
by inventing the theory of types). But to many readers of 
Quine's Methods of Logic it has come to mean something quite 
different. The impression which has unfortunately become wide- 
spread is that Frege discovered the quantifier not only in the 
sense of discovering it four years earlier than 0. H. Mitchell 
(Peirce's student and co-worker), but in the sense that it was 
Frege who, so to speak, launched the whole mighty ship by him- 
self. Reading the Heijenoort Source Book does little to dispel 
this impression. Certainly I must have believed something like 
this; otherwise I would not have been so surprised to discover 
the facts which follow. 
When I started to trace the later development of logic, the 
first thing I did was to look at Schrbder's Vorlesungen iiber 
die Algebra der Logik [1890-18951. This book, which appeared 
in three volumes, has a third volume on the logic of relations 
(Algebra und Logik der Relative, 1895). The three volumes were 
the best-known logic text in the world among advanced students, 
and can safely be taken to represent what any mathematician in- 
terested in the study of logic would have had to know, or at 
least become acquainted with, in the 1890s. 
As the title suggests, the approach was algebraic (Boole's 
logic, as we saw, grew out of abstract algebra), and the great 
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problem was to develop a logic of Relative (i.e., relations). 
(The influence of the German word Relativ is, perhaps, the rea- 
son Peirce always wrote "relatives" and not "relations.") 
Peirce, although himself a member of the algebraic school (he 
criticized himself for this, in his correspondence) had reser- 
vations about Schrijder's close assimilation of logical problems 
to algebraic ones. "While I am not at all disposed to deny that 
the so called 'solution problems', consisting in the ascertain- 
ment of the general forms of relatives which satisfy given con- 
ditons, are often of considerable importance, I cannot admit 
that the interest of logical study centers in them," Peirce 
writes [Peirce 1931, 3.5121. And "Since Professor Schrijder 
carries his algebraicity so very far, and talks of 'roots', 
'values', 'solutions', etc., when, even in my opinion, with my 
bias towards algebra, such phrases are out of place . .." 
[Peirce 1931, 3.5191. But my purpose in consulting this refer- 
ence wcrk was narrower; I simply wished to see how Schrijder pre- 
sented the quantifier. 
Well, Schrijder does mention Frege's discovery, though just 
barely. But he does not explain Frege's notation at all. The 
notation he both explains and adopts (with credit to Peirce and 
his students, 0. H. Mitchell and Christine Ladd-Franklin) is 
Peirce's. And this is no accident: Frege's notation (like one 
of Peirce's schemes, the system of existential graphs) repelled 
everyone (although Whitehead and Russell were to study it with 
consequential results). Peirce's notation, in contrast, was a 
typographical variant of the notation we use today. Like modern 
notation it lends itself to writing formulas on a line (Frege's 
notation is two-dimensional) and to a simple analysis of normal 
form formulas into a prefix (which Peirce calls the Quantifier) 
and a matrix (which Peirce calls the "Boolean part" of the 
formula). 
Moreover, as Warren Goldfarb [1979] has emphasized in a fine 
paper on the history of the quantifier, the Boolean school, in- 
cluding Peirce, was willing to apply logical formulas to differ- 
ent "universes of discourse," and Peirce was willing (unlike 
Frege) to treat first-order logic by itself, and not just as 
part of an ideal language (with a fixed universe of discourse, 
viz., "all objects," for Frege). In fact--and this may sur- 
prise you as it surprised me--the term "first order logic" is 
due to Peirce! (It has nothing to do with either Russell's 
theory of types or Russell's theory of orders, although the way 
Peirce distinguished between first-order and second-order form- 
ulas--by whether the "relative" is quantified over or not--ob- 
viously has something to do with logical type.) In summary, 
Frege tried to "sell" a grand logical-metaphysical scheme with 
a dubious ontology, while Peirce (and, following him, Schrijder) 
was busy "selling" a modest, flexible, and extremely useful 
notation. 
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The success they experienced was impressive. While, to my 
knowledge, no one except Frege ever published a single paper in 
Frege's notation, many famous logicians adopted Peirce-Schrbder 
notation and famous results and systems were published in this 
notation. LBwenheim stated and proved the L3wenheim theorem 
(later reproved and strengthened by Sknlem, whose name became 
attached to it together with Ltjwenheim's) in Peircian notation. 
In fact, there is no reference in Ltjwenheim's paper to any logic 
other than Peirce's. To cite another example, Zermelo presented 
his axioms for set theory in Peirce-Schrbder notation, and not, 
as one might have expected, in Russell-Whitehead notation. 
One can sum up these simple facts (which anyone can quickly 
verify--I warned you that I am no historian) as follows: Frege 
certainly discovered the quantifier first (four years before 
0. H. Mitchell, going by publication dates, which are all we 
have as far as I know). But Leif Erikson probably discovered 
America "first" (forgive me for not counting the native Ameri- 
cans who of course really discovered it "first"). If the effec- 
tive discoverer, from a European point of view, is Christopher 
Columbus, that is because he discovered it so that it stayed 
discovered (by Europeans, that is), so that the discovery be- 
came known (by Europeans). Frege did "discover" the quantifier 
in the sense of having the rightful claim to priority. But 
Peirce and his students discovered it in the effective sense. 
The fact is that until Russell appreciated what he had done, 
Frege was relatively obscure and it was Peirce who seems to 
have been known to the entire world logical community. How many 
of the people who think that "Frege invented logic" are aware of 
these facts? 
The example of Lijwenheim shows something else: metamathe- 
matical work (of a certain kind) did not have to wait for Russell 
and Whitehead to make Frege's work known (and to extend it and 
repair it). First-order logic (and its metamathematical study) 
would have existed without Frege. (Zermelo even denied that 
his set-theoretic work depended on Whitehead and Russell; he 
claimed to have been aware of the "Russell paradox" on his own 
[1908, n.9.1; reprinted in van Heijenoort [1967, p. 1911). 
THE PEIRCIAN INFLUENCE ON WHITEHEAD AND RUSSELL 
still, I thought, Russell and Whitehead themselves certainly 
learned their logic from Frege. To check this I turned to 
Russell's autobiographical writings. The result was frustrating. 
In My Philosophical Development [1959], Russell describes the 
impact that meeting Peano had upon his logical development. 
Strangely enough, he does not mention the quantifier, which 
seems so very central from our present point of view, at all. 
298 Hilary Putnam HM9 
Peano taught Russell what was a commonplace in the Peirce- 
Schrtjder logical community, the difference in logical form be- 
tween all men are mortal and Socrates is a man. And it is clear 
that one of the notations used in Principia for a universally 
quantified conditional--writing the variable of quantification 
under the sign of the conditional--came from Peano. But the 
quantifier as such is not something that Russell singled out 
for discussion (unless there is something in the unpublished 
Nachlass in the Russell Archives in Ontario). Even when Russell 
discusses his debt to Frege (in a peculiar way: Russell is un- 
stinting in his praise of Frege's genius, but claims to have 
thought of the definition of number quite independently), he 
does not mention the quantifier. Principia is no more help on 
this score, although there is an indication in it that most of 
the specific notations were invented by Whitehead rather than 
Russell. 
Since I have mentioned Peano, I should remark that he was 
not only well acquainted with Peirce-Schrtider logic, but he had 
actually corresponded with Peirce. As far as I know, no one 
has suggested that his logical contributions are independent of 
the main-line "Boolean" tradition. 
In desperation, I looked at Whitehead's Universal Algebra. 
This is a work squarely in the tradition to which Boole, 
SchrEder, and Peirce belonged, the tradition that treated gen- 
eral algebra and logic as virtually one subject. And here, 
before Whitehead worked with Russell, there is no mention of 
Frege but there is a citation of "suggestive papers," by Peirce's 
students 0. H. Mitchell and Christine Ladd-Franklin [Whitehead 
1898, p. 1161. The topic, of course, is the quantifier. 
In sum, I do not know where Russell learned quantification; 
but Whitehead certainly came to his knowledge of it through 
"Peirce and his students." On the other hand, the axioms in 
Principia are almost certainly derived from Frege's Begriff- 
schrift; Peirce gave no system of axioms for first-order logic, 
although his "existential graphs" are a complete proof procedure 
for first-order logic (an early form of natural deduction). 
NOT TO GO OVERBOARD 
I have, if anything, minimized Frege's contribution and 
played up the Boolean contribution for reasons which I have 
explained. But to leave matters here would be as unjust to 
Frege and to a third tradition, the Hilbert tradition (proof 
theory), as Quine's unfortunate remark was to the Boolean tra- 
dition. 
Frege's work is sometimes pooh-poohed today (I mean Frege's 
logical achievement; Frege's stock as a philosopher has never 
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been higher), though not, of course, by Quine. It is conceded 
that Frege was far more rigorous and, in particular, far more 
consistently free of use-mention confusions than other logicians; 
but such domestic virtue is no longer felt to be impressive. 
The central charge laid against his work (and Whitehead and 
Russell's) is that what they called logic is not logic but "set 
theory," and that reducing arithmetic to set theory is a bad 
idea. 
This raises philosophical issues far too broad for this 
paper. But let me just make two comments on this: (1) Where 
to draw the line between logic and set theory (or predicate 
theory) is not an easy question. The statement that a syllogism 
is valid, for example, is a statement of second-order logic. 
(Barbara is valid just in case (F)(G) (H)((Fx ~Gx) . (Gx I>x) 
3 (Fx 3 Hx)), for example.) If second-order logic is "set 
theory," then most of traditional logic thus becomes "set 
theory." (2) The full intuitive principle of mathematical in- 
duction is definitely second order in anybody's view. Thus 
there is a higher-order element in arithmetic whether or not 
one chooses to "identify numbers with sets." (Just as Frege 
realized.) 
But, philosophical questions aside, Frege certainly under- 
took one of the most ambitious logical investigations in all 
history. Its enormous sweep made it (after its repair by 
Whitehead and Russell, and its translation into a notation re- 
sembling Peirce's) a great stimulus to all future work in the 
field. The Hilbert school certainly put it in the center of 
their proof theoretic investigations: G8del's most famous paper 
[1931], after all, bears the title "On Principia Mathematics 
and Related Systems, I." That all its achievements could be 
imitated successfully by the Cantorians (Zermelo and von Neumann) 
does not take away either its priority or its influence. If 
Peirce and Schrgder were the cutting edge of the logical world 
prior to Principia Mathematics (or a cutting edge--the Hilbert 
school was already under way), after the appearance of Principia 
their work lost its importance-- or lost it except for one im- 
portant thing: its influence on Hilbert, who followed Peirce 
in separating first-order logic off from the higher system for 
metamathematical study. 
Principia in turn was to lose its "cutting edge" position 
when interest shifted from the construction of systems (and the 
derivation of mathematics within them) to the metamathematical 
study of properties of systems. Nothing remains forever the 
"cutting edge" in a healthy science. But a fair-minded state- 
ment of the historic importance of the different schools of 
work, a statement that does justice to each without slighting 
the others, should not be impossible. Such a statement was 
given by Hilbert and Ackermann: 
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The first clear idea of a mathematical logic was 
formulated by Leibniz. The first results were obtained 
by A. de Morgan (1806-1876) and G. Boole (1815-1864). 
The entire later development goes back to Boole. Among 
his successors, W. S. Jevons (1835-1882) and especially 
C. S. Peirce (1839-1914) enriched the young science. 
Ernst Schrader systematically organized and supplemented 
the various results of his predecessors in his 
Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der Logik (1890-1895), 
which represents a certain completion of the series of 
developments proceeding from Boole. 
In part independently of the development of the 
Boole-Schrader algebra, symbolic logic received a new 
impetus from the need of mathematics for an exact foun- 
dation and strict axiomatic treatment. G. Frege pub- 
lished his Begriffsschrift in 1879 and his Grundgesetze 
der Arithmetik in 1893-1903. G. Peano and his co-workers 
began in 1894 the publication of the Formulaire des 
Mathdmatiques, in which all the mathematical disciplines 
were to be presented in terms of the logical calculus. 
A high point of this development is the appearance of 
the Principia Mathematics (1910-1933) by A. N. Whitehead 
and B. Russell. Most recently Hilbert, in a series of 
papers and university lectures, has used the logical 
calculus to find a new way of building up mathematics 
which makes it possible to recognize the consistency of 
the postulates adopted. The first comprehensive ac- 
count of these researches has appeared in the Grundlagen 
der Mathematik (1934-1939), by D. Hilbert and P. Bernays. 
[Hilbert and Ackerman 1938, l-21 
If Quine had produced this statement in his preface, I should 
not have had a topic for this conference. 
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